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ABSTRACT 
Balancing a duty to a tribunal and a duty to a client can 
paralyze a lawyer. The task raises difficult questions about how to 
reconcile competing obligations as an advocate and as an officer of 
the court. Individuals licensed to prosecute patent applications 
must decide how to honor both their obligations to the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) and their obligation to successfully 
prosecute patent applications. This burden can result in willful 
blindness, where the patent attorney or patent agent (“patent 
practitioner”) limits inquiry into information that may bar a patent 
application. The recent Federal Circuit opinion in Therasense may 
have eliminated the judicial “duty to inquire” doctrine that kept 
these obligations in balance. This Issue Brief argues that there is a 
need to protect against willful blindness and proposes a 
resurrection of the eliminated doctrines.  
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,1 individuals 
licensed to prosecute applications on behalf of inventors—patent 
practitioners2—had an affirmative “duty to inquire” into information 
relevant to the prosecution of a patent.3 This duty barred patent practitioners 
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1 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
2 This Issue Brief refers to patent attorneys and patent agents collectively as “patent 
practitioners.” See 37 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2012) (defining “patent attorney” and “patent 
agent”).  
3 Brasseler, U.S.A. I.L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
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from willfully ignoring information deemed “material.”4 In Therasense, 
however, the Federal Circuit left the enforcement of this duty in peril by 
holding that there was no inequitable conduct even though the patent 
practitioner “should have known” of the materiality of undisclosed 
information.5  
The enforcement of the duty to inquire should survive Therasense. 
Without such enforcement, patent practitioners are unlikely to fully inquire 
into potentially material information to avoid finding information that may 
harm the client’s or the attorney’s interests and make it difficult to balance 
existing ethical obligations to the PTO and the client. A thorough inquiry, 
however, is in the public’s interest. To encourage inquiry, courts should 
ensure that patent practitioners cannot avoid a finding of inequitable 
conduct by willfully blinding themselves to material facts. Two doctrinal 
avenues are open: Courts may either hold that willful blindness constitutes 
knowledge of the materiality of the undisclosed information, or they may 
carve out an exception for egregious actions to avoid knowledge. Either 
way, it is imperative to adopt a doctrinal innovation that will encourage 
inquiry after Therasense.  
I. THERASENSE ELIMINATED THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY TO 
INQUIRE 
The Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion in Therasense heightened the 
standards needed to establish inequitable conduct. In Therasense, the patent 
holder omitted information by not disclosing to an examiner at the PTO that 
statements presented in prosecuting the patent in dispute were contradictory 
to statements made in prosecuting the patent’s European counterpart.6 
Individuals commit inequitable conduct if they “misrepresent[] or omit[] 
material information . . . with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.”7 
“Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if 
proved, bars enforcement of a patent.”8 Prior to Therasense¸ courts had 
                                                      
4 Id. at 1380 (“Where an applicant knows of information the materiality of which 
may so readily be determined, he or she cannot intentionally avoid learning of its 
materiality.”). 
5 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“A finding that the misrepresentation or 
omission amounts to gross negligence or negligence under a ‘should have known’ 
standard does not satisfy this [specific] intent requirement [of inequitable 
conduct].” (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 
867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988))). 
6 Id. at 1318. 
7 Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 F.3d 1357, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).  
8 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285. 
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“embraced . . . reduced standards for intent and materiality to foster full 
disclosure to the PTO.”9 In Therasense, the Federal Circuit observed that 
although “honesty at the PTO is essential,” these reduced standards had led 
to “overuse[]” of inequitable conduct.10  
In response, the Federal Circuit altered the standard for materiality. 
Before Therasense, the Federal Circuit’s definition of materiality tracked 
the PTO’s evolving definition of materiality.11 In Therasense, however, the 
court defined a “but-for materiality” standard, under which information is 
material if the PTO would not have allowed the claim but for the 
inequitable conduct.12  
The court also heightened the standard for intent. The court held 
that the “absence of a good faith explanation for failing to disclose” or a 
finding that a patent practitioner “should have known” and reported 
undisclosed information was no longer sufficient for a finding of intent to 
deceive the PTO.13 Under the new intent standard for omitted information, 
an “accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a 
deliberate decision to withhold it.”14 The court also divorced the 
relationship between intent and materiality by holding that stronger 
evidence of one would not redeem weaknesses in proving the other.15  
The en banc opinion in Therasense did not address whether a duty 
to inquire survived the heightened standard for intent—perhaps because the 
duty to inquire was not implicated in the facts of Therasense. In 
Therasense, there was an inconsistency in the position taken by the 
                                                      
9 Id. at 1288 (explaining that the court had previously found inequitable conduct 
based on “gross negligence” or a “broad view of materiality,” and had allowed 
weaknesses in proof of materiality if there was strong evidence of intent and vice 
versa). 
10 Id. at 1290 (explaining that “low standards for intent and materiality have 
inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, among them, increased 
adjudication cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, burdened 
courts, strained PTO resources, increased PTO backlog, and impaired patent 
quality”). 
11 See id. at 1288 (explaining that “[t]ying the materiality standard for inequitable 
conduct to PTO rules, which understandably change from time to time, has led to 
uncertainty and inconsistency in the development of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine” (citing Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006))). 
12 Id. at 1291–92 (reasoning that there is no “unfair benefit” without “but-for 
materiality”). 
13 Id. 
14 Id at 1290. 
15 Id. 
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applicant in front of the US and European PTOs.16 Prior to the en banc 
opinion, a panel of the Federal Circuit held that the attorneys did not violate 
a duty to inquire because the “record [did] not show, and no party ha[d] 
argued that [the attorneys] were on notice, at the time of the withholding” of 
this inconsistency.17  
While the en banc Therasense court did not explicitly address the 
duty to inquire, the opinion disincentivizes patent practitioners from seeking 
out material information. By heightening the knowledge component of the 
intent requirement, the Federal Circuit in Therasense removed sanctions for 
avoiding knowledge. After Therasense, the patent practitioner who does not 
inquire will not have actual knowledge of material information, which may 
not satisfy the new, heightened standard for inequitable conduct. At the 
same time, the court permitted penalties for having knowledge of material 
information. An inquiring patent practitioner risks finding information that 
may bar the practitioner from prosecuting a patent application. If the 
practitioner does not reveal this discovered information and the patent 
issues, she faces a finding of inequitable conduct. Further, the practitioner 
who inquires must reconcile ethical responsibilities to her client and to the 
PTO. The change in penalties and ethical complexities associated with 
inquiring make it unlikely a practitioner will inquire without an enforced 
duty.    
A. The Federal Circuit Likely Eliminated Sanctions for Avoiding 
Knowledge 
The PTO and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may place 
sanctions on practitioners who advocate positions without fully inquiring 
into the factual information underlying those positions. Under the PTO’s 
regulations, before “signing, filing, submitting, or . . . advocating . . . any 
paper” before the USPTO, individuals involved with filing and prosecuting 
a patent application have a duty to engage in “inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances” that “allegations and other factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or . . . are likely to have evidentiary support” and 
“denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence, or … are 
reasonable based on a lack of information.”18 This rule is based on Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19  
                                                      
16 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), rev’d en banc, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
17 Id. 
18 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b) (2012). 
19 Linda K. McLeod & Stephanie H. Bald, Ethical Issues in U.S. Trademark 
Prosecution and Practice, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 379 (2010). 
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Despite these available sanctions, the PTO does not “proactively 
pursue” practitioners’ failure to inquire. In 1988, the PTO “abandoned” any 
practice of finding fraud and inequitable conduct during the pendency of an 
application, “leaving issues of fraud or inequitable conduct to the courts.”20 
Currently, the PTO generally imposes sanctions only in response to the 
“few cases” brought by the public to the Office of Enrollment and 
Discipline (OED)21 and “final court determinations.”22 A court’s finding of 
inequitable conduct can result in the PTO taking “disciplinary action” 
against the patent practitioner.23  
The PTO itself recognizes that the threat of these sanctions is 
insufficient to encourage practitioners to inquire into material information 
and disclose adverse information. In arguing in an amicus brief against 
changing the standards for both materiality and intent, the PTO claimed that 
“[t]he prospect of agency disciplinary action for disclosure violations is 
unrealistic . . . because the Office is required by statute to file any charges 
within five years . . . and it seldom learns of inequitable conduct within that 
period of time. In addition, the PTO . . . rarely has access to relevant facts 
regarding inequitable conduct, because it lacks investigative resources.”24  
The recent changes under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act25 
(AIA) seem unlikely to encourage the PTO to begin enforcing the duty to 
inquire. Under the AIA changes, after a patent has issued, an individual in a 
supplemental examination can expose withheld information in hopes that 
                                                      
20 6 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03(6); see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1306 
(Bryson, J. dissenting) (“[T]he PTO has concluded that a court is the best forum in 
which to consider alleged breaches of the disclosure duty in the context of an 
inequitable conduct defense.”). 
21 About OED, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE (Jan. 3, 2013, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/news/index.jsp (explaining that among the 
many responsibilities of the OED is “investigat[ing] allegations of misconduct by 
practitioners”). 
22 Scott A. McKeown, USPTO Required to Police Fraud Under H.R. 1249?, 
OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2011/04/uspto-fraud-squad. 
23 See 6 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03(6)(j) (explaining that a patent practitioner 
may be subject to “disciplinary action” for violating the “duty of candor” to the 
PTO); see also 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2012) (explaining when the PTO can suspend or 
exclude a patent practitioner).  
24 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305–06 (Bryson, J. dissenting); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or 
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or 
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the 
date when the claim first accrued.”).  
25 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). 
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the PTO will not find the withheld information material, thereby avoiding 
sanction for inequitable conduct. Although the patent practitioner still risks 
sanctions through the PTO,26 “[t]he USPTO has made clear that the agency 
is ill-suited to pursue investigations into inequitable conduct due to a lack of 
resources, [and] subpoena power.”27 Therefore, it seems unlikely that this 
new provision under the AIA will dramatically encourage the PTO to 
investigate into the circumstances of withholding the information.  
Under the supplemental examination provision, it also seems 
unlikely that a practitioner who has ignored material information and 
received a patent without PTO detection of this material information will 
suddenly seek out this information and disclose it to the patent office. First, 
supplemental examination is available only to the patent owner,28 so the 
attorney would have to have his client institute this process, which seems 
unlikely given that the material information could still invalidate the claims 
of the patent. Second, the patent practitioner still faces possible PTO 
sanctions.29 Third, supplemental examination is unavailable once a patent 
owner has notice of a pleading in civil court related to a patent.30 Therefore, 
once the patent practitioner knows this patent will be analyzed by the 
courts, the practitioner and client have no PTO escape.  
Prior to Therasense, inequitable conduct provided a way for courts 
to sanction and thereby enforce the duty to inquire, with the litigants paying 
for the investigation. Where a patent practitioner “should have known that 
the withheld reference would be material to the PTO’s consideration, the 
failure to disclose the reference [was] sufficient proof of the existence of an 
intent to mislead the PTO.”31 Where a patent practitioner “avoid[ed] actual 
knowledge” the “‘should have known’ factor be[came] operative.”32 As the 
Federal Circuit explained in Brasseler, U.S.A. I.L.P. v. Stryker Sales 
                                                      
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 257(f)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this section [on supplemental 
examination] shall be construed . . . to limit the authority of the Director to 
investigate issues of possible misconduct and impose sanctions for misconduct in 
connection with matters or proceedings before the Office.”). 
27 McKeown, supra note 22.  
28 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2012) (“A patent owner may request supplemental 
examination of a patent . . . .”). 
29 35 U.S.C. § 257(f)(2) (2012). 
30 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“[Supplemental examination] shall not apply to 
an allegation pled with particularity in a civil action.”). 
31 Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Kansas Jack, Inc. 
v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
32 See FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc. 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that avoiding actual knowledge may take the form of “cultivat[ing] 
ignorance, or disregard[ing] numerous warnings that material information or prior 
art may exist”). 
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Corp.,33 the duty to learn of potential information that requires disclosure 
arose under two circumstances: (1) where the patent practitioner was “on 
notice of the likelihood that specific, relevant, material information exists 
and should be disclosed;” and (2) where the patent attorney was aware of 
information which “suggests the existence of specific information” that may 
be material and “ascertained with reasonable inquiry.”34  
After Therasense, establishing an intent to withhold omitted 
material information requires proof by “clear and convincing evidence” that 
(1) the person “knew” of the undisclosed reference, (2) “knew” of its 
materiality, and (3) made a “deliberate decision to withhold” the material 
information.35 Since the judicial standard now requires actual knowledge, it 
seems that a failure to inquire is no longer sufficient for a finding of an 
intent to deceive the PTO. The PTO itself does not appear poised to enforce 
a duty to inquire. Therefore, the threat of inequitable conduct appears to be 
moribund, removing a powerful sanction for practitioners who avoid 
learning of material information. 
B. The Costs of Inquiring, Without the Possibility of Sanction, 
Discourage Learning of Material Information 
Despite Therasense, patent practitioners continue to have a duty to 
inquire under the PTO’s regulations.36 The high costs of complying with the 
duty, however, will encourage patent practitioners to narrowly construe 
what this duty entails. Patent practitioners face an immediate personal cost 
if they embark on an inquiry and discover information that could bar a 
patent application. In Brasseler, for example, the patent attorneys knew of 
prior sales of an invention, but did not investigate whether the date of such 
sales barred a patent application for the invention.37 Had the attorneys 
inquired, however, they would have been unable to file the application, 
potentially losing income from this work.  
The current financing model for patent prosecution further 
incentivizes willful blindness in the absence of an enforced duty to inquire. 
“Over the past few decades, patent practitioners have developed . . . the use 
of flat fees, contingent fees and royalties.”38 In the case of flat fees, patent 
practitioners earn money based on work product, and a patent practitioner 
                                                      
33 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
34 Id. at 1382. 
35 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co, 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
36 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2) (2012). 
37 Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1383. 
38 Kenneth R. Shurtz. How Far Should the PTO Regulate Business Relationships of 
Patent Practitioners?, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 169, 186 (2009). 
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that wants to earn more money is incentivized to file and prosecute even 
meritless applications to produce more work product in the form of patent 
applications and office actions. In the case of contingent fees and royalties, 
a patent practitioner still has an incentive to push through meritless patent 
application because any payment under these financial arrangements comes 
from an issued patent, not a patent practitioner’s opinion that the application 
is not patentable. 
A practitioner concerned with the interests of the client also faces 
costs to the client for inquiring. Judge Bryson, dissenting in Therasense, 
went so far as to argue that even if the patent practitioner finds material 
information, she likely would not disclose it due to the costs to the client’s 
interests.39 It is in the best interest of the client to avoid immediate 
invalidation from disclosure of material information during prosecution and 
risk unenforceability in litigation for inequitable conduct.40 Bryson noted 
that no matter how faithful the practitioner is to PTO obligations, even “an 
open door may tempt a saint.”41  
However, the client’s interests after discovering material 
information are not as clear at Judge Bryson alleges. A finding of 
inequitable conduct, described by the Federal Circuit as the “‘atomic bomb’ 
of patent law,”42 creates substantial costs of its own. Inequitable conduct in 
regards to a “single claim renders an entire patent unenforceable”43 and “can 
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents 
and applications.”44 Further, a finding of inequitable conduct “may also 
spawn antitrust and unfair competition claims,” justify an award of 
attorneys’ fees, or provide an “exception to attorney–client privilege.”45 The 
attorney also personally faces the possibility of disciplinary action for a 
                                                      
39 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305–06 (Byson, J. dissenting) (“[T]here will be no 
inducement for the applicant to be forthcoming. If the applicant withholds prior art 
or misleadingly discloses particular matters and succeeds, he obtains a patent that 
would not have issued otherwise. Even if the nondisclosure or misleading 
disclosure is later discovered, under the majority's rule the applicant is no worse 
off, as the patent will be lost only if the claims would otherwise be held invalid.”). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)). 
43 Id. (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 
(Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 1289. 
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finding of inequitable conduct as explained above, not to mention 
reputational damage.46  
More likely, the patent practitioner will not inquire at all, to 
preserve the interests of both client and attorney. The practitioner has little 
expectation of sanctions for avoiding knowledge and avoids the risk of 
discovering material information. Discovering material information has 
several associated costs, including possible concession of the patentability 
of an application or risking a finding of inequitable conduct if the 
practitioner does not concede. Under this enforcement structure, patent 
practitioners are “encourage[d] or even require[d] . . . to engage in riskier 
behavior” to prevent knowledge of material information that might subject 
them to a finding of inequitable conduct.47  
C. Avoiding Knowledge Reconciles Ethical Responsibilities to the 
Practitioner’s Client and the PTO 
In May of 2013, new rules went into effect regarding patent 
practitioners’ professional obligations to the PTO.48 The purpose of the 
revisions was to align the PTO Code of Professional Responsibility with the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association.49  
However, even under the new rules, a patent practitioner still faces 
conflicting ethical responsibilities and is encouraged to avoid knowledge of 
material information. A patent practitioner has duties of loyalty and 
advocacy to her client. At the same time, however, the patent practitioner 
must reconcile these duties to the client with duties of truthfulness to the 
PTO,50 and must “make inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” into 
contentions made to the PTO.51 The easiest way to do this is to avoid 
inquiring into material information that may result in information that the 
practitioner is ethically obligated to reveal, but that may injure the 
practitioner’s obligations to the client. For example, the patent practitioner 
                                                      
46 Katherine E. White, “There’s a Hole in the Bucket:” The Effective Elimination of 
the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 716, 719 
(2012) (“[I]nequitable conduct charges damage a patent attorney’s reputation as a 
bad actor.”).  
47 Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First 
Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226, 254 (2012).  
48 Changes to Representation of Others Before The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER (Apr. 3, 2013) 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/04/03/2013-07382/changes-to-
representation-of-others-before-the-united-states-patent-and-trademark-office. 
49 USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE 
(July. 17, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/ethics.jsp. 
50 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012). 
51 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b) (2012).  
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may not ask about prior sales or unnamed inventors. This is especially 
problematic going forward under the changes in the legal landscape brought 
about by the America Invents Act (AIA), where uncertainty remains on 
statutory application bars. For example, a patent practitioner prosecuting an 
application post-AIA may not inquire about secret commercial uses because 
it is not clear whether such secret uses, especially pre-AIA, will bar an 
application.52  
Often patent practitioners are patent attorneys with additional 
expectations and ethical responsibilities not expressly incorporated into the 
professional obligations required of all patent practitioners before the PTO. 
The PTO currently reports an approximate 1:3 ratio of active patent agents 
to active patent attorneys.53 Attorneys serve as advocates, and “[a]s an 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of 
the adversary system.”54 It is difficult for an attorney to advocate with 
information that endangers her client’s case before the PTO because the 
duty of candor55 requires the attorney to poison the application by revealing 
this information.  
The PTO has underscored the duty of the patent practitioner to 
poison the application by adding Rule 11.106 as part of the May 2013 PTO 
Code of Professional Responsibility revisions. Rule 11.106 prioritizes 
disclosure to the PTO by stating, “A practitioner shall disclose to the Office 
information necessary to comply with applicable duty of disclosure 
provisions.”56  
It is easy to advocate without possessing all relevant information in 
patent prosecution, when it is unlikely that the patent attorney will be 
surprised by revealed material information. Under an “adversarial system 
. . . advocacy for two opposing parties will eventually illuminate the 
truth.”57 However, during prosecution, the patent practitioner principally 
faces an examiner who reviews the patent application to make sure the 
application conforms to statutory requirements for patent applications.58 The 
                                                      
52 Dennis Crouch and Jason Rantanen, Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior Art? 
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/did-the-aia-eliminate-
secret-prior-art.html. 
53 Patent Attorneys/Agents Search…, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Aug. 
26, 2013, 4:45 PM), https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/query.jsp (citing 10,749 active 
agents and 31,213 active attorneys). 
54 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble (2012). 
55 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012). 
56 37 C.F.R. § 11.106 (2013). 
57 Joe Kelly, The Genesis Of Corruption In Criminal Lawyers, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 591, 601 (2012). 
58 The AIA changes may make patent prosecution more adversarial by allowing 
increased opportunities for third parties to show the PTO material information 
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examiner has no interest in disallowing the patent application. Rather, the 
examiner is incentivized to allow the patent application because the PTO 
only generates revenue for allowances.59 Further, an examiner can 
maximize the credit the examiner receives though a quick allowance under 
the new examiner count system, which rewards the examiner less and less 
the longer the examiner reviews the application.60 The length of time the 
examiner reviews a rejected application is driven by the applicant who 
responds to office actions and makes requests for continued examination. 
An examiner can end this review through allowance. Further, the large 
backlog of patent applications confronting the typical patent examiner is 
itself an incentive to quickly dispose of patent applications. In 2011, the 
PTO reported a backlog of more than 1.2 million pending utility patent 
applications.61 Allowances obviate lengthy examiner reviews of an 
application, allowing the examiner to begin reviewing a new application 
and earn additional credit.  
In patent prosecution, there is only one advocate, the patent 
practitioner, who wields great control over the facts presented. The patent 
attorney’s advocacy is limited by duties to the PTO. Under Rule 11.303 
under the PTO Rules of Professional Conduct, “[a] practitioner shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal by the practitioner.”62 Tribunals include the PTO,63 so when the 
patent attorney initially files the patent application with the PTO, the 
attorney is within the reach of this rule. If the PTO rejects a patent 
application, the application faces several levels of tribunal review including 
                                                                                                                         
including Post Grant Review. However, this process is based on the European 
Patent Office procedure, under which on average only 5 percent of granted patents 
are opposed. See Susan J. Marsnik, Will The America Invents Act Post-Grant 
review Improve the Quality of Patents? A Comparison with the European Patent 
Office Opposition., UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS ETHICS AND BUS. LAW FACULTY 
PUBL’NS 2, 6 (Sept. 24, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2151444. 
59 Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s 
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2062 (2009) 
(“[U]nder the current fee structure, a large percentage of the front-end examination 
cost is recouped through back-end issuance fees as well as maintenance fees, which 
are considerably higher than front-end filing fees . . . . Not only do applicants who 
secure and maintain patents dramatically subsidize those whose patents are denied, 
but the current fee structure also sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO 
to grant patents.”). 
60 Gene Quinn, USPTO’s New Examiner Count System Go into Effect, 
IPWATCHDOG, (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/26/usptos-
new-examiner-count-system-go-into-effect/id=9310/. 
61 Marsnik, supra note 58, at 4. 
62 37 C.F.R § 11.303 (2013).  
63 37 C.F.R § 11.1 (2013).  
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the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and the Federal Circuit. Litigated patents 
face district court tribunals and possibly appeals of this court’s decision. 
The patent attorney acting as an advocate will want to achieve successful 
patent applications on the client’s behalf. The attorney’s duties to the 
tribunal however, will prevent false statements, so the easiest way—indeed, 
perhaps the only way—for the patent attorney to satisfy both duties is to 
intentionally avoid learning material information that may bar a patent 
application and thereby falsify the attorney’s statement that the subject 
matter of the patent application is patentable.  
Similarly, Rule 11.304 of the PTO Rules of Professional Conduct 
declares that “a practitioner shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s 
access to evidence or unlawfully . . . conceal a document or other material 
having potential evidentiary value.”64 To prevent concealing or obstructing 
information to the PTO or third parties opposing an application, the attorney 
is forced to engage in willful blindness to continue to advocate for the 
client.  
A patent practitioner faces risks to his own and his client’s interests 
when inquiring into material information that may bar patentability, and is 
further encouraged by existing ethical obligations to severely limit inquiry. 
Therefore, the recent Federal Circuit’s change in standards to prevent 
meritless inequitable conduct claims likely sacrificed adherence to the duty 
to inquire. 
II. THE DUTY TO INQUIRE SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE 
Preserving the duty to inquire provides valuable public benefit, 
guides the patent practitioners through vague or underenforced ethical 
duties, and reconciles Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.  
A. The Duty to Inquire Serves the Public Interest 
The duty to inquire helps ensure the quality of patents and lowers 
the likelihood of granting a monopoly on information already in the public 
domain. The “scope of the patent claims” defines the “boundary of a patent 
monopoly.”65 Knowledge of material information may drive the 
modification of claims to carve out a narrower area not already in the public 
domain. Patents are invalid if the scope of the claims covers material 
already in the public domain,66 and can be invalidated in litigation if a 
challenger shows that the claims fall short of the statutory requirements for 
                                                      
64 Id. 
65 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980). 
66 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (requiring patentable material to be novel). 
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patentability.67 If the patent is not invalidated, however, the public is 
harmed when an invention the public had understood to be in the public 
domain is removed and put under a monopoly.  
Further, uncovering material information after the patent 
practitioner files the application imposes costs on the PTO, competitors, and 
the public. The change in standards required in Therasense will shift the 
burden of determining if a patent meets statutory requirements to the PTO 
because it “reduce[s] the care and patent quality responsibilities [of] 
applicants.”68 If the PTO does not discover this information and issues the 
patent, society pays a cost through reduced competition, thus allowing the 
monopoly patent-holder to set the prices for products at a higher price.69 
Professors Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge postulate that patent-
litigation costs will go up because Therasense will increase the proportion 
of low-quality patents that are likely to be invalidated in litigation, and 
competitors will likely spend more money to litigate a patent if they can 
invalidate it.70  
These costs—the cost to the PTO of analyzing the patents, the cost 
to the public of honoring the patent holder’s monopoly, and the cost to 
competitors of litigating the patent—could be avoided if the patent 
practitioner initially screened inventions for patentability before pursuing a 
patent. Rantanen and Petherbridge contend that patent practitioners and 
applicants are best situated to ensure that patents meet the statutory 
requirements because often the information is at the “applicant’s fingertips” 
and the PTO does not have the necessary “resources to ensure that only 
deserving inventions receive patents.”71 The duty to inquire forces the 
patent practitioner to find information that may help in this initial screening 
without shifting the burden to the PTO.  
Even if the patent practitioner finds information that may not bar 
patentability, federal regulation provides that “[t]he public interest is best 
served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time 
an application is being examined, the [PTO] is aware of and evaluates the 
teachings of all information material to patentability.”72 It is difficult for the 
PTO to be aware of all material information without the help of the patent 
                                                      
67 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2239–40 (2011) 
(“[Microsoft] sought a declaration that the patent was invalid under § 102(b)’s on-
sale bar, which precludes patent protection for any ‘invention’ that was ‘on sale in 
this country’ more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application.”). 
68 Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 47, at 239. 
69 Id. at 243. 
70 See id. at 245 (postulating that the change in Therasense will produce more “low-
quality patents” and “competitor[s] will resist liability more vigorously”). 
71 Id. at 239. 
72 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012). 
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practitioner in inquiring and supplying that information. For example, if an 
inventor kept his process out of the public domain but commercially 
produced for sale a product of this process for over a year, his 
patent application should be barred.73 However, the PTO may never learn of 
this activity without the inquiry of the patent practitioner and subsequent 
disclosure.  
If the material information never surfaces, the patent owner holds a 
monopoly in violation of statutes carefully crafted to “draw[] a line between 
the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent, and those which are not.”74 Without the duty to inquire, the public’s 
interest suffers from improper monopolies.   
B. Patent Practitioners Need Clear Guidance with Enforcement not 
Provided by Existing Ethical Duties 
Even in the absence of a duty to inquire enforced through penalties 
for inequitable conduct, patent practitioners still have ethical considerations 
that may discourage willful blindness. A single patent attorney may have 
ethical considerations as an attorney,75 an engineer,76 and an agent of the 
PTO.77 However, when these guidelines are explored, it becomes apparent 
that they are vague and unenforceable guidelines that do not limit an 
attorney’s role as an advocate. In contrast, under the pre-Therasense duty to 
inquire, a patent practitioner had guidance on when to inquire—and 
enforcement through sanctions derived from a finding of inequitable 
conduct.78 A court-defined and enforced standard for the duty to inquire is 
                                                      
73 See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that “where a patented method is kept secret and remains secret after a 
sale of the unpatented product of the method[, s]uch a sale prior to the critical date 
is a bar if engaged in by the patentee or patent applicant” (quoting In re Caveney, 
761 F.2d 671, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). 
74 See Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, 
Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
175, 180–181 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, D.C., Taylor & Maury 1854)) 
(explaining the purpose of the patent monopoly). Jefferson, notably, was also the 
author of the 1793 Patent Act. 
75 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012) (requiring 
attorneys not engage “knowingly” in “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation”). 
76 See, e.g., NAT’L SOC’Y OF ENGINEERS, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS, Rule 
II.3 (2007), available at http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/CodeofEthics/ 
Code-2007-July.pdf (requiring licensed professional engineers to “be objective and 
truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony”). 
77 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (requiring PTO agents and attorneys to 
disclose information “material to patentability”). 
78 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
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still needed to ensure that patent practitioners fulfill all ethical obligations 
and disclose information needed by the PTO. 
1. PTO ethical duties impose guidelines without enforcement 
The PTO requires that “[e]ach individual associated with the filing 
and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith 
in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the [PTO] all 
information known to that individual to be material to patentability.”79 This 
requirement burdens the patent practitioner with revealing information, but 
does not require the practitioner to actively acquire information. Without a 
duty to inquire, the fact that both the applicant and the patent practitioner 
have a duty to disclose information is insufficient to ensure that the PTO 
has all the information necessary to decide on an application. Even if the 
applicant has the information and the inventor also owes a duty of candor to 
the PTO, the inventor may not have the training to know what information 
is material to patentability until prompted by the attorney. In this situation, 
the duty to inquire guides a useful exchange of information that provides the 
material information the PTO needs.  
To aid in a patent practitioner’s “duty of disclosure,” the Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) provides helpful suggestions for what 
an attorney should inquire into, such as “possible public uses and sales.”80 
These suggestions indicate that the duty to disclose has implications for 
inquiry and that willful blindness will not satisfy the ethical responsibilities 
of the patent practitioner to disclose material information to the PTO. Once 
again, there is no mechanism to ensure that these duties are honored.81 The 
court-defined duty of inquiry, however, did enforce very similar duties, and 
did so effectively. For example, in Brasseler, the court noted that it is not 
inequitable conduct for an attorney to rely on information disclosed by the 
client unless there is reason to doubt this information, and cited the 
suggested questions set forth in MPEP § 2004.82 By protecting attorneys 
following the suggestions of the MPEP, the court enforced these 
suggestions by the PTO. If the court-defined duty of inquiry disappears, 
however, so does enforcement of the PTO’s duty of inquiry.  
2. Attorney ethical duties impose vague, uncertain guidelines 
                                                      
79 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012) (emphasis added). 
80 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2004 (8th ed., 9th rev. Aug. 2012). 
81 See id. (explaining that “it is not appropriate to attempt to set forth procedures by 
which attorneys, agents, and other individuals may ensure compliance with the duty 
of disclosure”). 
82 Brasseler, U.S.A. I.L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1382–83 & n.4 
(Fed. Cir. 2001).  
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Patent practitioners that are also attorneys have an ethical duty 
under Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to not 
“knowingly assist or induce another to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”83 “Knowingly” denotes “actual knowledge” but such “knowledge 
may be inferred.”84 If either the practitioner or the applicant violates the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the practitioner is ethically responsible. It is 
“professional misconduct” to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”85 or “engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”86 Choosing not to inquire may 
allow an inference of knowledge of the materiality of the reference under 
this rule. Willful blindness may evidence dishonest behavior, or submitting 
an incomplete record of potentially material information may misrepresent 
the scope of material information. It is more likely that willful blindness is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, because it can result in the 
issuing of a patent that unjustly takes useful inventions out of the public 
domain or prevents subsequent inventors from claiming these inventions. 
These are unfair results to the public or to the inventor, and contrary to the 
statutory scheme devised by Congress in granting patents.  
In the end, however, Rule 8.4 is vague at best for patent attorneys, 
and instructs only what an attorney should not do. Incorporating Rule 8.4 
into the May 2013 revisions to the PTO Rules of Professional Conduct by 
adding Rule 11.804 did little to clarify what a patent practitioner should 
do.87 Neither Rule 8.4 nor Rule 11.804 defines unethical behavior with the 
determinacy to stand against the tide of incentives to avoid learning of 
material information. A clearly defined duty—with corresponding judicial 
enforcement—is needed. 
3. Scientific ethical duties suggest that a patent practitioner should not 
engage in willful blindness, but lack clear guidelines 
Many patent practitioners also have scientific backgrounds, with 
associated ethical guidelines. For example, out of the thirty-two approved 
Bachelor’s degrees to qualify as a patent agent or attorney, eighteen are 
engineering majors.88 The National Society of Engineers has developed its 
                                                      
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2012). 
84 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2012). 
85 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012). 
86 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2012). 
87 See ABA and USPTO Rule Comparison Chart, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND 
DISCIPLINE, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/AbavsUSPTO.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2013) (comparing Rule 8.4 and Rule 11.804). 
88 General Requirements Bulletin for Admission to the Examination for Registration 
to Practice in Patent Cases Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
USPTO (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/ 
GRB_March_2012.pdf.  
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 57  
own ethical guidelines89 that are enforced under state authority by civil 
penalties for those licensed as “professional engineers.”90 These engineering 
rules are relevant in the context of patent prosecution because they were 
developed to protect the professional reputation of the engineers, and 
engineers often use their engineering training in developing and prosecuting 
patent applications. 
These guidelines direct patent practitioners away from willful 
blindness. Under the guidelines, engineers “shall not attempt to injure, 
maliciously or falsely, directly or indirectly, the professional reputation, 
prospects, practice or employment of other engineers.”91 There is no 
requirement here that the engineers violating this rule know that the person 
they are injuring is another engineer. If the patent practitioner through 
willful blindness allows a patent application to file before another engineer-
applicant, and that patent application should not have been filed, the patent 
practitioner risks injuring the professional reputation of the inventor he 
represents and the prospects or employment of the later engineer-applicant. 
Furthermore, patent practitioners bound by engineers’ ethical duties 
have enhanced duties to engage in fact finding. For example, the guidelines 
provide that “[e]ngineers shall be objective and truthful in professional 
reports, statements, or testimony. They shall include all relevant and 
pertinent information in such reports.”92 Likely, a patent application would 
be viewed as a professional report, as it includes a specification of the 
relevant science.93 This duty to include all information indicates that 
engineers are expected to seek out and find such relevant information.  
Engineers also have affirmative duties to “strive to serve the public 
interest.”94 In addition, engineers and attorneys both have duties to avoid 
deceptive acts.95 Yet neither the ethical guidelines for engineers nor those 
for attorneys provide clarity on how patent practitioners are to avoid 
deceptive acts or what constitutes deception. 
                                                      
89 NAT’L SOC’Y OF ENGINEERS, supra note 76.  
90 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-21(a)(4) & (c) (2013), available at 
http://www.ncbels.org/forms/gs89c.pdf (authorizing a board comprising 
professional engineers to impose sanctions based on ethics violations adopted by 
the board up to amount of $5,000). 
91 NAT’L SOC’Y OF ENGINEERS, supra note 76, Rule III.7.a. 
92 Id. Rule II.3.a.  
93 See 35 U.S.C § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using 
it.”). 
94 NAT’L SOC’Y OF ENGINEERS, supra note 76, Rule III.2. 
95 See, e.g., id. Rule II.5. 
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Accordingly, although the ethical duties imposed upon engineers 
generally align with the responsibility of patent practitioners to inquire, they 
do not direct a course of action that would engage in inquiry. Where the 
PTO has provided suggestions, these suggestions are not enforced. Without 
clear guidelines, practitioners—operating as advocates, concerned about the 
potential costs of inquiring—will move further away from learning material 
information. Thus, neither PTO rules, attorney ethical standards, nor 
engineering ethical standards substitute for the pre-Therasense, judicially 
enforced duty to inquire.  
C. A Duty to Inquire Reconciles Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
Precedent to Proscribe Willful Blindness in Patent Law 
Prior Federal Circuit opinions supported the duty to inquire because 
it prohibited “cultivat[ing] ignorance” to avoid actual knowledge.96 Without 
the duty to inquire, there is little to encourage a patent practitioner to learn 
material information. In Therasense, the Federal Circuit’s expressed goal, in 
changing the materiality and knowledge standards, was to limit the amount 
of information submitted to the PTO and the number of claims of 
inequitable conduct.97 However, honoring a duty to inquire would result in 
production of information only if the inquiry resulted in a finding of 
materiality. This production of information would expose any validity 
issues with the patent well before issuance and inequitable conduct 
challenges.  
In sacrificing the duty to inquire in exchange for potentially 
reducing claims of inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit has effectively 
nullified its case law prohibiting patent practitioners from engaging in 
willful blindness. Scholars have further suggested that excluding willful 
blindness may even be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent 
holding in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.98  
In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court held that willful blindness could 
establish knowledge in the context of patent infringement.99 The Court 
identified two elements for determining when willful blindness exists and 
establishes knowledge: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that 
there is a high probability that a fact exists, and (2) the defendant must take 
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”100 Under this standard, 
                                                      
96 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
97 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co, 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc).  
98 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).  
99 Id. at 2068–2071. 
100 Id. at 2070. 
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some think willful blindness must implicate liability for inequitable 
conduct, as well.101  
This standard is useful in the context of inequitable conduct for 
many of the same policy reasons cited by the Court in Global-Tech. The 
Court noted that “defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable 
as those who have actual knowledge”102 and “persons who know enough to 
blind themselves to direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual 
knowledge of those facts.”103 These statements pertain no less forcefully to 
inequitable conduct. Accordingly, the knowledge requirement in the 
heightened inequitable conduct standards should be satisfied by or 
inferrable from a finding of willful blindness.  
The Supreme Court in Global-Tech used broad strokes in applying 
willful blindness to patent law. The Court found that willful blindness is 
widely accepted in the criminal context and reasoned that these principles 
apply in the realm of patent infringement.104 The Court—over a sharp 
dissent—allowed no special protection for those “who actively encourage 
others to violate patent rights and who take deliberate steps to remain 
ignorant of those rights.”105 The Court’s direct application of the criminal 
standard of willful blindness to the patent context indicates that carving out 
willful blindness from inequitable conduct in patent prosecution may be 
inconsistent with the policy announced in Global-Tech Appliances. 
That the Global-Tech Appliances standard is applicable to patent 
prosecution is further evidenced by the recent district court decision in 
Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc.106 In that case, decided after 
Therasense, the court ruled that the willful blindness standard announced in 
Global-Tech applied to misrepresentations before the PTO where a party 
registered a federal trademark for goods to which the party did not affix the 
                                                      
101 See, e.g., Kevin E. Noonan, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., PATENT 
DOCS (May 31, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/06/global-tech-appliances-
inc-v-seb-sa-2011.html (noting the potential applicability of the concept of willful 
blindness to inequitable conduct as already applied in the context of inducing 
infringement); D. Christopher Ohly, Therasense: Another Case For Rejection Of 
Rigid Rules, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 20 (2011) (suggesting that the 
Therasense opinion may be inconsistent with the possible broader implications of 
Global-Tech Appliances). 
102 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069. 
103 Id. (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). 
104 See id. (“[E]very Court of Appeals—with the possible exception of the District 
of Columbia Circuit . . . —has fully embraced willful blindness, applying the 
doctrine to a wide range of criminal statutes.”). 
105 Id. at 1269 n.8.  
106 810 F.Supp.2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
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trademark or intend to affix the trademark.107 Practitioners who file 
documents related to trademarks have the same statutory duty to inquire.108 
It seems incongruous that practitioners should be subject to stricter 
enforcement of this duty for trademark applications, but not for patent 
applications.  
III.  COURTS SHOULD RESURRECT THE DUTY TO INQUIRE 
The need for the duty to inquire and the incentive imbalance left in 
the wake of Therasense creates a need for some enforceable standard that 
prohibits willful blindness. Courts are institutionally well-situated for the 
task of defining and enforcing the standard, as willful blindness should be a 
fact-bound inquiry elucidated through concrete cases, and adverse litigants 
have the best incentive and resources to expose the relevant facts. The best 
way to do this is for the Federal Circuit to clarify that willful blindness 
remains a viable and enforced doctrine post-Therasense. Alternatively, 
courts could directly adopt the new standards proposed in Global-Tech that 
currently apply to patent infringement. As a final option, the courts could 
create an exception to the current standards for particularly egregious 
willful blindness.  
A. The Court-defined Duty to Inquire Provides Enforced Guidelines 
that Balance a Practitioner’s Responsibilities to the Client and the 
PTO 
The duty to inquire into potential information that requires 
disclosure arises under two circumstances: (1) where the patent attorney is 
“on notice of the likelihood that specific, relevant, material information 
exists and should be disclosed,” and (2) where the patent attorney is aware 
of information which “suggests the existence of specific information” that 
may be material and “ascertained with reasonable inquiry.”109 Pre-
Therasense willful blindness doctrine was workable and congruent with a 
patent practitioner’s other duties, and the Federal Circuit should affirm that 
it remains viable and enforceable post-Therasense.110 Because the attorney 
essentially has to have a lead that there was information to find, the attorney 
                                                      
107 Id. at 1043–44. But see Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of 
Jerusalem of Rhodes & of Malta v. Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of 
Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Order, 
702 F.3d 1279, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2012) (declining to extend the holding of 
Global-Tech from patent law into the context of trademark law). 
108 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b) (2012) (applying to all correspondence filed in the PTO). 
109 Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
110 For an outline of the doctrine, see supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
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is not required “to pursue a fishing expedition.”111 This allows the attorney 
to advocate without constant suspicion of the client’s patent.  
The case law has also drawn a fact-intensive distinction between 
willful blindness and mere negligence, limiting the responsibilities of the 
patent practitioner in the latter case. The Federal Circuit has recognized 
exceptions to the attorney’s duty to inquire when the attorney relies on 
information provided by clients112 or on the work of other attorneys.113 This 
ensures that the patent practitioner does not face liability for inquiring but 
finding incorrect information. It also protects attorney-client trust by 
allowing the patent practitioner to rely on the client. 
Finally, the duty to inquire supports the principle described in both 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent that a party who engages in 
willful blindness has culpability. The Federal Circuit, by removing “should 
have known” as a standard for determining intent, did not expressly 
foreclose willful blindness. The Federal Circuit equated “should have 
known” with gross negligence or negligence.114 Similarly, the Supreme 
Court has said willful blindness does not implicate negligence or reckless 
intent.115 Therefore, an interpretation of Therasense that aligns with Federal 
Circuit and Supreme Court case law must preserve the possibility of finding 
inequitable conduct for willful blindness.  
B. Courts Can Resurrect the Duty to Inquire by Finding that Failing 
to Inquire Constitutes Knowledge 
A practitioner’s failure to inquire could rise to the heightened level 
of knowledge required for intent to deceive after Therasense. If the patent 
attorney is “on notice” of material information,116 this may constitute 
sufficient knowledge of at least the materiality of the reference to satisfy the 
heightened-knowledge component of intent to deceive the PTO necessary to 
find inequitable conduct. Alternatively, when a patent practitioner is aware 
of information which “suggests” material information and the practitioner 
                                                      
111 Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1382. 
112 See id. at 1382–83 (finding there is no duty to inquire when the attorney relies 
on his client, unless there is a reason to doubt the client). 
113 See Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (finding no inequitable conduct where an inventor prosecuting a patent 
application pro se thought a reference was immaterial based on the advice of an 
attorney performing a search of the prior art). 
114 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co, 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
115 Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2071 (May 31, 2011). 
116 See Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1383 (explaining that a practitioner has a duty to 
inquire when the patent practitioner is “on notice of the likelihood that specific, 
relevant, material information exists and should be disclosed”). 
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can easily review this information,117 this may be sufficient to infer 
knowledge, because a patent practitioner who has a duty to inquire should 
look. Such a holding would be supported by the reasoning of Global-Tech 
Appliances: “[P]ersons who know enough to blind themselves to direct 
proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts.”118  
Yet another alternative, if the duty to inquire alone is insufficient to 
define a standard of behavior that supports the heightened knowledge 
component of intent after Therasense, is for courts to directly adopt the 
two-prong analysis in Global-Tech Appliances, finding knowledge when (1) 
the patent practitioner subjectively believes that there is a high probability 
that material information exists, and (2) the patent practitioner takes 
deliberate actions to avoid learning of this material information.119 
Unfortunately, this test, like many of the other ethical duties imposed on 
patent practitioners, illuminates what not to do as opposed to what to do. 
Still, adopting this test would provide some disincentives for engaging in 
willful blindness by providing sanctions for this behavior.  
C. Alternatively, Courts Can Recognize an Exception to the 
Heightened Inequitable Conduct Standard 
Currently, the Federal Circuit recognizes an exception to the but-for 
materiality requirement where there is evidence of an affirmative act of 
“egregious misconduct.”120 While there is currently no judicially recognized 
exception to the specific intent requirement, the benefits of preventing 
willful blindness and maintaining ethical obligations may suggest that 
courts could apply the egregious misconduct doctrine in such 
circumstances. 
In Therasense, the court found that a person would not engage in 
egregious conduct unless she felt that it would affect issuance of the patent 
application. From this behavior, the court could infer that the patent would 
not have issued with the disclosure. Similarly, courts could view willful 
                                                      
117 See id. at 1382 (explaining that a patent practitioner has a duty to inquire when 
the practitioner is aware of information which “suggests the existence of specific 
information” that may be material and “ascertained with reasonable inquiry”). 
118 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069 (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 
700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). 
119 Id. at 2070. 
120 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co, 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (finding a person would not engage in egregious conduct unless the 
person felt that it would affect issuance of the patent application); see also id. at 
1292–93 (finding “filing of an unmistakably false affidavit” is egregious and failure 
to disclose prior art is not egregious); Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 
1221, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding a patentee’s failure to update the PTO 
regarding a lack of grounds to expedite an application is not egregious). 
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blindness as constituting egregious behavior, and infer not only knowledge 
of the materiality but a specific intent to deceive the PTO.  
The court in Therasense does not foreclose the possibility that an 
intent exception could exist. The court says “[b]ecause direct evidence of 
deceptive intent is rare, a district court may infer intent from indirect and 
circumstantial evidence,”121 where the intent to deceive is “the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.”122 
CONCLUSION 
The recent Therasense opinion likely hindered enforcement of the 
duty to inquire into information that could potentially bar a patent 
application. Without enforcement, patent practitioners have little incentive 
to protect the public interest in disclosure. Thus, the duty to inquire is 
needed both to prevent willful blindness, which harms the public interest, 
and to the support ethical duties of the practitioner as an attorney, scientist, 
or agent of the PTO. Judicial enforcement of the duty to inquire will 
buttress Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. Several solutions to 
resurrect the duty to inquire are possible, including introducing the standard 
that a lack of inquiry constitutes knowledge, adopting alternative willful 
blindness standards, and creating an exception to the current heightened 
standard for intent to deceive the PTO. The Federal Circuit’s policies to 
prevent patent practitioners from cultivating ignorance must be enforced 
through some mechanism or such policies will be ignored.  
                                                      
121 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (citing Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart 
Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
122 Id. (citing Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
